| Mario Benjamin Menéndez | |
|---|---|
| Mario Menéndez (right) with Leopoldo Galtieri, the President of Argentina, in April 1982 on the Falkland Islands. | |
| Military Governor of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands | |
| In office 3 April 1982 – 14 June 1982 |
|
| President | Leopoldo Galtieri |
| Preceded by | Sir Rex Hunt |
| Succeeded by | Jeremy Moore |
| Personal details | |
| Born | April 3, 1930 Buenos Aires[1] |
| Nationality | Argentine |
| Alma mater | Colegio Militar de la Nación |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance | Argentina |
| Service/branch | Argentine Army |
| Rank | Brigadier general |
| Battles/wars | Falklands War |
|
||||||||||||||||||||
Mario Benjamin Menéndez (born April 3, 1930[1]) was an Argentine governor of the Falkland Islands. He also served in the Argentine Army. He surrendered Argentine forces to Britain during the Falklands War.
Contents |
Menéndez progressed from a cadet at the national military college to the top ranks of the Argentine military. As a full colonel serving in the 5th Mountain Infantry Brigade, he participated in Operativo Independencia,[1] a counter-insurgency campaign against separatist marxist ERP guerrilla from Tucuman province. In March 1982, Menéndez was a general in the Argentine Army, and the commander of the Buenos Aires first corps.[2]
On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands, which was British territory, and gained control that day. On 3 April, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced that British forces had been dispatched to recapture the islands. Menéndez arrived in Stanley (the capital of the Falkland Islands) on 7 April, with the purpose of taking over the governorship of the Falklands.[3] One book described him as a "competent soldier".[3] Menéndez competed with the senior representatives of the Argentine navy and air force for dominance; a competition which was formally concluded on 26 April when Menéndez appointed himself head of the Malvinas Joint Command, an action which was approved by the Argentine government.[4] Two Argentine brigadier generals commanded forces in the Falklands.[4] They were both senior to Menéndez, and treated his orders as suggestions.[4] Menéndez planned to fight an attrition campaign against the British forces, from fixed defences.[5] The plan was later criticized, but historian Duncan Anderson contended after the war that the plan "suited admirably the capabilities of the soldiers he had at his disposal".[5]
British troops landed onto the islands in May, and inflicted a number of defeats upon the Argentine defenders during the course of the month. When British forces won at the Battle of Goose Green on May 29, "the gloom and despondency that gripped Menéndez and his headquarters soon infected many Argentine officers".[6] In a bold move, Menéndez in late May assembled all his army, national gendarmerie and airforce special forces with a "plan to plant a north-south screen to strike at the British logistics line of communication and capture British soldiers."[7] They were ambushed by the Special Air Service and Mountain and Artic Warfare Cadre patrolling Mounts Kent and Simon and had a Puma helicopter shot down. Ten Argentine commandos were killed and 23 were injured or taken prisoner in the heli-borne offensive. Brigadier Julian Thompson commented: "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."[8] In the first week of June, as British forces prepared to assault a number of hills near Stanley, Menéndez was pressured to try to attack the Falklands settlement of Fitzroy, which had recently come under British control, but he decided to stay on the defensive.[9] After the hills were captured by the British, Menéndez considered withdrawing his forces from Stanley, and holding an airfield located nearby.[10]
A Buenos Aires based diplomat said after the British landings: "[Menéndez] will never surrender in the Falklands unless he's satisfied that Argentina's honor will be respected. If it's at risk, he'll fight on, maybe even after his own people tell him it's time to stop."[1]
On 14 June, Menéndez spoke with Lieutenant-General Leopoldo Galtieri-the President of Argentina-by radio regarding the situation.[10] Galtieri said that Menéndez should counter-attack against the British forces with all of his soldiers, and told him that the Argentine military code stipulated that a commander should fight until he has lost 50% of his men and used 75% of his ammunition.[10] He also added "the responsibility today is with you", which Duncan Anderson argues was the point at which Menéndez's morale finally broke.[11] Menéndez replied, "I cannot ask more of my troops, after what they have been through...We have not been able to hold on to the heights...We have no room, we have no means, we have no support...".[11] Anderson said that Menéndez was then psychologically isolated, and believed he had been deserted by his government, and started communicating almost gratefully with a Spanish-speaking British officer who had got in touch with him by radio.[11] Menéndez agreed to meet with representatives of the commander of British land forces on the islands that afternoon, and Menéndez surrendered his forces in the evening.[11]
Within a month after the surrender, Menéndez had been removed from his positions of power.[12] According to Menéndez's mother, Hilda Villarino de Menéndez, her son was arrested in October 1983 by the Argentine Army, and sent to a base for 60 days of disciplinary detention.[13] She said that the arrest had "apparently something to do" with a book her son had published, which covered his experiences during the war.[13] In 2009, Menéndez claimed that oft-quoted figure of 30,000 disappeared people during the 1976-1983 Argentine military dictatorship was "invented number" and lambasted former Army Chief, Lieutenant-General Martín Antonio Balza for supporting the 30,000 figure. Menendez also criticized Balza for not owning up to his role in the Dirty war and for portraying Argentine officers in his book Malvinas: Gesta e Incompetencia (Editorial Atlántida, 2003) as "idiots or pusillanimous." [14]
In retrospect, historians Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins criticised the fact that the Argentine Army had failed to defend key features on the Falklands, interdict the British advance, or harass or counter-attack against positions that had been captured by the Royal Marines or British paratroopers, and contended that Menéndez may have lacked confidence in the ability of Argentine conscript soldiers to do these things,[15] as well as suggesting that Menéndez was shocked by the fact that the British were determined to recapture the islands and he never recovered from this.[16] They do argue that Menéndez's general deployment of his forces was sound, however.[12]